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Abstract
Objectives. Validation of a Danish patient safety incident classiﬁcation adapted from the World Health Organizaton’s
International Classiﬁcation for Patient Safety (ICPS-WHO).
Design. Thirty-three hospital safety management experts classiﬁed 58 safety incident cases selected to represent all types and
subtypes of the Danish adaptation of the ICPS (ICPS-DK).
Outcome Measures. Two measures of inter-rater agreement: kappa and intra-class correlation (ICC).
Results. An average number of incident types used per case per rater was 2.5. The mean ICC was 0.521 (range: 0.199–0.809)
and the mean kappa was 0.513 (range: 0.193–0.804). Kappa and ICC showed high correlation (r = 0.99). An inverse correlation
was found between the prevalence of type and inter-rater reliability. Results are discussed according to four factors known to
determine the inter-rater agreement: skill and motivation of raters; clarity of case descriptions; clarity of the operational deﬁni-
tions of the types and the instructions guiding the coding process; adequacy of the underlying classiﬁcation scheme.
Conclusions. The incident types of the ICPS-DK are adequate, exhaustive and well suited for classifying and structuring inci-
dent reports. With a mean kappa a little above 0.5 the inter-rater agreement of the classiﬁcation system is considered ‘fair’ to
‘good’. The wide variation in the inter-rater reliability and low reliability and poor discrimination among the highly prevalent in-
cident types suggest that for these types, precisely deﬁned incident sub-types may be preferred. This evaluation of the reliability
and usability of WHO’s ICPS should be useful for healthcare administrations that consider or are in the process of adapting
the ICPS.
Keywords: adverse events, patient safety, incident reporting and analysis, risk management, taxonomy
Introduction
Since 1 January 2004, reports about patient safety incidents
occurring in hospitals in Denmark have been reported to a
national patient safety reporting system. In a 2010 amendment
to the Health Act, the reporting system was extended to
include incidents occurring at private practices and pre-hospital
sector including municipal health services and pharmacies, and
to allow patients and relatives to report safety incidents. The ex-
tension of reporting to non-hospital sectors offered an oppor-
tunity to enhance the electronic reporting system to improve
incident management, retrieval and statistics. With this upgrade,
the classiﬁcation of incidents began to use an international
standard: the World Health Organization’s International
Classiﬁcation for Patient Safety (ICPS-WHO) [1–4].
Over several years, observers have called for the collection
and analysis of data on patient safety incidents in order to
support learning from failures and thereby to mitigate risks
to patients [5–9]. One key tool for analysing incidents and
extracting useful data is a classiﬁcation system or taxonomy
[10, 11] to capture and distinguish different types of failures
and their causal factors. The WHO’s World Alliance has
developed the International Classiﬁcation for Patient Safety
(ICPS) in order to establish ‘a common format to facilitate
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aggregation, analysis and learning across disciplines, borders
and time’ [12].
Because of reporting bias, counting types of incidents, fail-
ures, problems and causes does not provide a valid picture
of the true distribution [13]. Nevertheless, a classiﬁcation
system can support the analysis of incidents, aid the discov-
ery of trends (e.g. same problems with infusion pumps in
several places) and facilitate learning if users can share narra-
tives about ‘similar’ failures and problems. It is useful also
when selecting ‘similar’ events for subsequent ‘in-depth’ ana-
lysis. The Danish National Board of Health adopted the
ICPS in order to contribute to international cooperation on
standardization of terminology and methods, on the planning
of interventions and, in general, to engage in research collab-
oration on further development and use of a common inci-
dent reporting system [13].
Objective
Adapting the ICPS’s incident type classiﬁcation to the
Danish reporting system provided the opportunity to test the
validity and reliability of a prototype of the ICPS. The
intended users of the classiﬁcation system (front-line staff
and safety managers in hospitals and the primary sector in-
cluding municipal health services) can be expected to receive
limited training in use of the system. It was deemed essential
that the system should be easy to use and require little train-
ing beyond a succinct user guide. The purpose of the pilot
test was (i) to capture and possibly correct usability problems
of the classiﬁcation system before its ﬁnalization and (ii) to
assess the inter-rater reliability of the use of the system.
Methods
A Patient Safety Classiﬁcation Workgroup (see
Acknowledgments) translated the ICPS-WHO Incident
Type classiﬁcation into Danish and adapted it to the Danish
healthcare sector—henceforth referred to as ICPS-DK.
In addition to translating the original ICPS-WHO classiﬁca-
tion terms into Danish, some elements were reorganized and
the incident type ‘Professional documentation’ was expanded
to include communication.
The core of the ICPS-DK consists of 13 main types and
16 subtypes, henceforth collectively referred to as types that
form the mandatory part of the reporting system (see
Table 1). In this mandatory part, incidents are classiﬁed
according to the relevant healthcare process only, without
specifying the problem or the contributing factors. Risk man-
agers are obliged to classify any reported incident into one or
more of the types deﬁned by the mandatory part. In addition
to the mandatory incident types, a detailed optional set of
types is available to allow users to assign additional codes
that may be helpful to learning (e.g. contributing factors).
The rationale for deﬁning a relatively small but mandatory
set of incident types was to achieve a balance between
succinctness and speciﬁcity, optimizing the information
capture relative to the amount of effort required to classify
cases.
Selection of raters
Hospital safety managers were recruited to serve as raters in
the study, as they had experience with classifying incidents in
the prior reporting system and there were no raters available
in non-hospital sectors (primary care, nursing homes, etc.).
Each of the ﬁve Danish regions, who are responsible for the
provision of hospital services in Denmark [14], was asked to
recruit 10 safety managers and to nominate managers with
prior experience classifying incidents in the previous system.
There was no formal selection procedure. Two reminder
e-mails were sent to non-responders. In a follow-up ques-
tionnaire, 70% of the raters reported that they were ‘very
experienced’ in classifying adverse events suggesting that this
convenience sample of raters will be typical of end users of
the classiﬁcation scheme.
Selection of patient safety incident cases
The existing reporting system receives about 25 000 reports
each year. A sample of 500 patient safety incident cases was
selected at random from consecutive serious cases reported
during 2009 with SAC score 1 or 2 (Safety Assessment
Code) [15]. From this sample of 500 cases, further selection
was done to produce two cases matched to each of the 29
incident types of the mandatory part of the classiﬁcation.
None of the 500 cases involved ‘Self-harm’ and so two add-
itional cases involving ‘Communication and documentation’
were selected. Another two cases were selected to illustrate
the systems to raters for a total of 60 cases. The cases pre-
sented to the raters were anonymized but otherwise exactly
as reported.
Test material
Participants received by e-mail instructions for the test, the
user guide, the case descriptions of the 60 patient safety inci-
dent cases (average number of words = 113; range: 24–380)
and the classiﬁcation table (see Table 1). The user guide con-
tained a short introduction to the system, and for each of the
29 incident types a short deﬁnition of the type and at least
one example (narrative) of a typical case was given. The user
guide explains brieﬂy how to use the scheme, emphasizing
that the classiﬁcation is non-exclusive (‘inclusive’), i.e. an inci-
dent may be assigned to one or more types. Participants
were instructed to select incident types based on the infor-
mation described in the case and not on speculation. Two of
the 60 cases were provided as instructional examples along
with classiﬁcations and explanations for the selection of
types (made by the authors). Participants were promised
anonymity.
Reliability test: ICPS-DK • Safety and incident reporting
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Table 1 The mandatory part of the Danish adaptation of ICPS used in the pilot test (each case must be classiﬁed using at
least one of the listed incident types)
Type
Administrative processes
1 Handovers/shift changes/sector changes/referral
Transfer of responsibility for patients
2 Appointment
An agreement or arrangement for a meeting between a patient and a healthcare professional
3 Waiting list/waiting time/continuity break
A queue of patients desiring appointments with a healthcare professional. Problems with continuity of care
4 Admissions/reception
The formal acceptance by a healthcare organization of a patient to receive health services
5 Discharge
Processes where the healthcare organization’s or programme’s active responsibility for the patient’s care is terminated
6 Patient identiﬁcation
The process of checking, conﬁrming and/or validating who the patient is
7 Informed consent
The expressed, implied or documented permission of the patient to undergo a therapeutic intervention.
8 Other/not known
Other administrative processes
Clinical processes
9 Screening/prevention/routine checkup
Processes to identify, to minimize the impact of, or retard the progression of, a disease of a disease, as well as regular
examinations
10 Diagnosis/examination/assessment
Processes of determining the nature of a disease or condition
11 Treatment/intervention/monitoring
Therapeutic actions taken to address diseases or injuries, including monitoring and control of the effects of the actions
taken
12 Care/rehabilitation
Processes of patient’s continuing care needs or strategies for providing services to meet those needs
13 Test/survey/test results
Processes related to the patient’s tests, test specimens and/or diagnostic results, e.g. execution of, interpretation of and
reaction on tests.
14 Detention/ﬁxation
Processes of physical and pharmaceutical limitation of a patient
15 Other/not known
Other clinical processes
16 Professional communication and documentation
Incidents involving oral and written (including electronic) communication and documentation
17 Medication
Incidents involving any process related to the medication of a patient
18 Medical equipment
Incidents related to the use or misuse of medical equipment, including malfunctions of the equipment
19 Infection
Infections that are acquired in hospitals or as a result of healthcare interventions
Blood and blood components
20 Incidents involving any process related to the use of blood and blood components
21 Gases and air for medical use
Incidents involving any process related to the use of gases and air for medical use
Self-harm, suicide attempts or suicide
22 Self-harm
Incidents where a patient consciously performs self-harm without the intention to die
(continued )
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Statistical analyses
Two measures of the inter-rater agreement were used: kappa
and ICC (intra-class correlation), the former because it is a
widely used measure of inter-rater agreement and the latter
because the interpretation of kappa is controversial [8–11]
due to the way it handles chance agreement. The ICC
measure used is the ICC (2,1) described by Shrout and Fleiss
[16]. Statistics were calculated using Stata/MP 11.1 [17].
Results
Thirty-three of the 43 raters returned their responses. Not all
raters classiﬁed all the 58 cases. Of the possible 1914 rater–
cases (33 raters times 58 cases), 1619 (85%) had been com-
pleted. Several raters noted that the task took longer than
expected, as discussed later.
Per-case analysis
The average number of types used per case per rater was
2.5. Eighty-ﬁve per cent of the 1619 rater–cases were classi-
ﬁed using three or fewer types (99% using ﬁve or fewer
types), and only one rater classiﬁed a case as having seven
types. When all ratings by the 33 raters are considered, the
mean number of types used per case was 8.9 (range: 4–15).
ICC and kappa for all 58 cases are given in Table 2. The
mean ICC was 0.521 (range: 0.199–0.809) and the mean
kappa was 0.513 (range: 0.193–0.804). The pairwise correl-
ation (Pearson’s r) between ICC and kappa was 0.998.
The length of the case descriptions was positively corre-
lated with the inter-rater agreement: ICC increased by 1.2
percentage points for every10-word increase in the length of
the case description (P= 0.001). An inter-quartile range in-
crease in the number of words in the case description (80
words) was associated with an increase in ICC of 9.7 per-
centage points. The three cases with the lowest and the three
with the highest inter-rater agreement are copied in Table 3.
Per-type analysis
ICC and kappa for all 29 types are given in Table 4. The
mean ICC was 0.454 (range: 0.006–1.000) and the mean
kappa was 0.479 (range: 0.005–1.000). The pairwise correl-
ation (Pearson’s r) between ICC and kappa was 0.999. There
was no association between self-rated experience with the
former classiﬁcation system and ICC measures (data not
shown).
Prevalence of incident type use
The prevalence of use of an incident type was deﬁned, some-
what arbitrarily, as the proportion of cases used by ‘at least
one’ rater. The prevalence of the incident types varied con-
siderably. Six of the 29 types were used with a prevalence
>50% (see Table 4; numbers in parentheses in this section
refer to the type numbers in Table 4 and Fig. 1). The most
prevalent type was ‘Resources and organization’ (28), which
was used by at least one rater in 56 of the 58 cases (preva-
lence = 97%). Also, ‘Professional communication and docu-
mentation’ (16) and ‘Treatment/intervention/monitoring’
(11) were used frequently, with prevalences of 90 and 79%,
respectively. In contrast, ‘Gases and air for medical use’ (8),
‘Suicide attempt’ (23), ‘Suicide’ (24) and ‘Fall’ (25) had preva-
lences of <10%.
There was a strong inverse association between the preva-
lence and the inter-rater agreement (Fig. 1). However, a
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 1 Continued
Type
23 Suicide attempt
Incidents where a patient attempts suicide
24 Suicide
Incidents where a patient commits suicide
Patient accident
25 Fall
Incidents where a patient falls
26 Other
Other patient accidents
27 Buildings and infrastructure
Problems involving the basic facilities and services needed for the functioning of the healthcare organization
28 Resources and organization
Problems involving individual, team or organizational factors, including occupational factors
29 Other incident type
Other incident types not otherwise classiﬁable
Main types are in bold and subtypes in italics font.
Reliability test: ICPS-DK • Safety and incident reporting
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group of ‘residual’ incident types [e.g. ‘Other/not known’
(8, 15, 29)] demonstrated both very low prevalences and very
low ICCs and another group of incident types [‘Medication’
(17), ‘Medical equipment’ (18) and ‘Buildings and infrastruc-
ture’ (27)] demonstrated relatively high prevalences and rela-
tively high ICCs.
Discussion
This pilot study of safety incident classiﬁcation using a
Danish version of the ICPS demonstrated a fair-to-good reli-
ability of the ICPS classiﬁcation with a mean inter-rater
agreement kappa close to 0.5 [18]. The raters in this pilot
project were volunteers who, while they were experienced at
classifying hospital events, had not received formal training
other than a short written introduction including two exam-
ples of pre-classiﬁed cases. In another safety classiﬁcation
system, the human factors analysis and classiﬁcation system
has reported kappa estimates as high as 0.7 [19–21], whereas
others have found estimates of index of concordance as low
as 0.2 [22]. However, in practice, most reporting systems will
offer only minimal training to raters and so our results may
be more reﬂective of the reliability of real practice in the ﬁeld
when such reporting systems are used.
Four factors serve to determine the inter-rater agreement
[19]: the skill and motivation of the raters (raters’ ability); the
clarity of the cases (the nature of the items to be classiﬁed);
the clarity of the operational deﬁnitions of the types and the
directions that guide the coding process (the deﬁnition of
types and the instructions) and the adequacy of the under-
lying classiﬁcation scheme (the taxonomy).
The skill and motivation of the raters
The raters were under artiﬁcial constraints. They were given
the user guide documentation and the pilot cases at the same
time, and were allowed only 1 week to return the completed
ratings. Additional instruction and training of the raters may
have improved inter-rater reliability. Not all raters completed
the entire pilot set, with cases skipped throughout, and with
some raters skipping the last 10–15 cases. Several raters
noted that the rating exercise required much more than the
expected 4 h. Therefore, a better estimate of the time needed
to complete the pilot test or a shorter test with fewer cases
could possibly have increased the inter-rater agreement, al-
though the inter-rater agreement was not associated with and
therefore did not decline with the presentation order of the
58 cases in the test material (data not shown).
The clarity of the cases
The clarity, the complexity and especially the subject matter
of the cases comprised the second group of factors deter-
mining the inter-rater agreement. The assessment of clarity
and complexity is difﬁcult, but the number of words in the
case description may offer a crude measure of clarity. This is
to some degree supported by the observation that the
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 2 ICC and kappa, by case
Case ICC Kappa R (T) Case ICC Kappa R (T) Case ICC Kappa R (T)
1 33 (3) 21 0.81 0.8 26 (4) 41 0.42 0.41 18 (11)
2 33 (3) 22 0.5 0.49 26 (8) 42 0.67 0.66 27 (9)
3 0.34 0.34 26 (15) 23 0.52 0.51 21 (9) 43 0.6 0.59 26 (10)
4 0.48 0.48 33 (10) 24 0.81 0.8 21 (5) 44 0.31 0.3 13 (9)
5 0.6 0.59 30 (9) 25 0.65 0.64 28 (6) 45 0.69 0.68 24 (8)
6 0.73 0.73 32 (9) 26 0.43 0.42 21 (9) 46 0.24 0.23 11 (11)
7 0.24 0.24 16 (11) 27 0.56 0.56 23 (7) 47 0.64 0.63 27 (6)
8 0.75 0.75 33 (9) 28 0.68 0.67 28 (7) 48 0.52 0.51 24 (9)
9 0.64 0.63 28 (8) 29 0.55 0.54 24 (10) 49 0.34 0.34 15 (8)
10 0.76 0.75 33 (6) 30 0.54 0.53 19 (7) 50 0.45 0.45 20 (10)
11 0.72 0.71 28 (6) 31 0.49 0.48 19 (7) 51 0.28 0.27 16 (10)
12 0.48 0.47 27 (8) 32 0.47 0.46 21 (9) 52 0.51 0.5 21 (10)
13 0.43 0.42 25 (7) 33 0.42 0.42 19 (10) 53 0.44 0.43 17 (9)
14 0.37 0.36 21 (8) 34 0.64 0.63 27 (10) 54 0.46 0.46 20 (7)
15 0.41 0.4 20 (8) 35 0.49 0.48 19 (9) 55 0.55 0.54 24 (10)
16 0.38 0.37 23 (9) 36 0.5 0.49 24 (9) 56 0.61 0.6 25 (8)
17 0.72 0.71 32 (6) 37 0.54 0.53 20 (6) 57 0.55 0.54 21 (13)
18 0.71 0.7 24 (8) 38 0.36 0.35 18 (11) 58 0.6 0.59 25 (11)
19 0.59 0.58 29 (14) 39 0.38 0.37 19 (9) 59 0.55 0.54 21 (10)
20 0.42 0.41 26 (13) 40 0.51 0.5 25 (11) 60 0.2 0.19 9 (8)
Case: the analyses were made case by case. Cases comprise 58 patient safety incident cases that were classiﬁed by the raters. Cases 1 and 2
were pre-classiﬁed by the authors and used for instruction. ICC, intra-class correlation. The pairwise correlation between ICC and kappa is
0.999. R (T): number of raters (number of types used by all raters combined to classify the case).
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number of words in the case description was strongly and
positively associated with the inter-rater agreement.
Presumably, more words reduce ambiguity. Furthermore, as
can be inferred from Table 3, short-case descriptions can
lead raters to speculate and to select incident types that may
be unwarranted based on the case description. For example,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 3 Case descriptions of the three cases with lowest and highest inter rater agreement
C Case description
60 Event description: patient escapes from a closed section. The patient leaves the closed section together with a maintenance
worker while nobody was watching
Consequence of the incident: the patient may need longer treatment
Type (no of raters): 11(3), 14(9), 15(1), 16(4), 26(3), 27(8), 28(8), 29(4). Kappa: 0.19
46 Event description: refuse collector blocks the door open for convenience while collecting the garbage. A dangerous person
escapes from the closed section
Consequence of the incident: course of treatment interrupted and thus worsening or prolongation of the acute psychotic
episode, risk of vandalism or violence.
Type (no of raters): 1 (1), 3 (1), 8 (1), 11 (2), 14 (9),16 (2), 23 (1), 26 (2), 27 (10), 28 (11), 29 (6). Kappa: 0.23
7 Event description: a control X-ray of the chest that should have been carried out was not ordered
Consequence of the incident: prolongation of hospital stay
Type (no of raters): 1 (9), 2 (10), 3 (12), 5 (1), 8 (2), 9 (2), 10 (11), 11 (2), 13 (7), 16 (16), 28 (1). Kappa: 0.24
10 Event description: a patient with inoperable cholangiocarcinoma and IDDM is prescribed a glucose drop as the patient is
fasting and the patient potassium is high. The drop was set at ∼22.45 yesterday. This morning we discover that the drop
is 1 l sodium chloride/glucose added with Actrapid (insulin) and not a pure glucose solution. Overnight the patient had
a need for extra sugar due to low blood sugar
Consequence of the incident: patient’s blood sugar dropped during the night. As the patient has had diabetes for a long time,
she was able to feel the blood sugar coming down and alerted the nurse. In the worst-case scenario, it could have ended
up with coma or death. Unclear how frequent causes of the incident: it was a temporary nurse who never before had
been here at this department, who made the dropped yesterday evening
Proposals for action: more permanent staff, more carefulness with regard to medicine, etc
Type (no of raters): 1 (2), 11 (20), 16 (6), 17 (33), 18 (1), 28 (28). Kappa: 0.75
24 Event description: at ∼5 p.m. the furnace guard got a message from NNIT (IT support) that the voltage of the UX 9, the
network server for the intensive care unit, was 0. At the investigation the furnace guard found the switch for the UX 9
on the electrical board in the basement was turned off. The board is located in a locked room and the switch can only
be turned off by a physical action. To re-establish the power, two other switches in the electrical cabinet had to be
dismounted, which delayed the remediation of the situation
Consequence of the incident: as far as known, no consequence for the patients. The staff of the department were very
troubled. The possible consequences could have been fatal
Causes of the incident: the investigation found that the switch for the UX 9 on the electrical board in the basement was
turned off. The electrical board is located in a locked room and can only be turned off by a physical action
Proposals for action: electrical cabinets should be locked with a key. Electrical cabinets should not be over-crowded and all
switches should be freely accessible.
Type (no of raters): 15 (1), 18 (1), 26 (1), 27 (21), 28 (2). Kappa: 0.80
21 Event description: power outage in ∼20 min where the back-up power also failed to operate
Consequence of the incident: no consequence. Could have had serious consequences, if we, at that time have had very
unstable patients
Causes of the incident: new buildings: electricity work was being carried out
Proposals for action: back-up power should always work. In situations (ex. construction work) where there is a risk that
departments may experience power failure, departments should be warned
Type (no of raters): 21 (2), 27 (26), 28 (2), 29 (1). Kappa: 0.80
C, case number. The types used by the rates for classiﬁcation of the case and the number of rates using each type are given at the bottom
of each cell. Refer to Table 1 for type titles.
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the brief description of Case 7 (‘A control x-ray of the chest
that should have been carried out was not ordered’) led to
the use of 11 different incident types by raters although only
‘Handovers/shift changes/sector changes/referral’, ‘Waiting
list/waiting time/continuity break’, ‘Test/survey/test results’
and ‘Professional communication and documentation’ seem
warranted based on the interpretation by the authors.
Although participants were instructed to select incident types
based only on the case description without further specula-
tion about the context, raters may have found it difﬁcult to
adhere to this instruction when a short case description was
presented. Ten raters (30%) used ‘Diagnosis/examination/
assessment’ to classify Case 7 perhaps misinterpreting this as
a case descriptor rather than an incident type, highlighting
the importance of communicating the distinctions among
incident types to raters in advance. The number of words in the
case description is a potentially modiﬁable factor. Reporters of
incidents should be encouraged not to be too terse in their case
description.
In this pilot test, two patient safety incident cases per inci-
dent type were selected to maximize the variance in the cases
to improve the validity of the estimate of the inter-rater
agreement. However, whether this choice would increase or
decrease the estimates of inter-rater agreement (compared
with a random sample of cases) is not clear.
The clarity of the operational definitions
of the types
The third group of factors determining the inter-rater ag-
reement is the clarity of the operational deﬁnitions of the
types and the user guide. From Fig. 1 several clusters of
types emerge. The types in the lower right hand side of the
ﬁgure, having low inter-rater agreement and high prevalence,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 4 ICC, kappa and prevalence, by type
Type ICC Kappa Prevalence
Administrative processes
1 Handovers/shift changes/sector changes/referral 0.30 0.33 0.69
2 Appointment 0.32 0.35 0.24
3 Waiting list/waiting time/continuity break 0.20 0.22 0.64
4 Admissions/reception 0.26 0.29 0.24
5 Discharge 0.50 0.54 0.14
6 Patient identiﬁcation 0.74 0.77 0.14
7 Informed consent 0.71 0.74 0.10
8 Other/not known 0.03 0.03 0.22
Clinical processes
9 Screening/prevention/routine check-up 0.06 0.07 0.50
10 Diagnosis/examination/assessment 0.26 0.28 0.60
11 Treatment/intervention/monitoring 0.35 0.38 0.79
12 Care/rehabilitation 0.51 0.55 0.38
13 Test/survey/test results 0.39 0.42 0.41
14 Detention/ﬁxation 0.47 0.51 0.14
15 Other/not known 0.01 0.01 0.14
16 Professional communication and documentation 0.24 0.27 0.90
17 Medication 0.81 0.83 0.26
18 Medical equipment 0.63 0.66 0.29
19 Infection 0.38 0.41 0.17
20 Blood and blood components 0.60 0.64 0.10
21 Gases and air for medical use 0.58 0.62 0.09
Self-harm, suicide attempts or suicide
22 Self-harm . . .
23 Suicide attempt 0.94 0.94 0.07
24 Suicide 1.00 1.00 0.03
Patient accident
25 Fall 0.93 0.94 0.07
26 Other 0.53 0.57 0.14
27 Buildings and infrastructure 0.58 0.62 0.28
28 Resources and organization 0.28 0.31 0.97
29 Other incident type 0.09 0.11 0.12
ICC, intra-class correlation. The pairwise correlation between ICC and kappa is 0.999. The prevalence of an incident type was deﬁned as
used by ‘at least one’ rater to classify the 58 cases.
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are characterized by being either general or unspeciﬁc, e.
g. ‘Handovers/shift changes/sector changes/referral’(1) and
‘Waiting list/waiting time/continuity break’(3) (numbers
in parentheses refer to the type numbers in Table 4 and
Figure 1. These are very broad types, and moreover, pro-
blems with transfer of care and continuity break have
achieved high attention in the recent years, which might have
inﬂated the prevalence. The high prevalence of ‘Diagnosis/
examination/assessment’ (1) and ‘Treatment/intervention/
monitoring’ (11) probably indicates the high prevalence of
these problems in practice. However, in deﬁning the compre-
hensiveness of the mandatory part of the classiﬁcation, a
more detailed sub-classiﬁcation was not thought to be fruit-
ful. In the Danish version, the ICPS-WHO incident type
‘Professional documentation’ was complemented with com-
munication (oral, written), and may also cover communica-
tion failures. To encourage more precision, this type has
subsequently (and based on this pilot test), been expanded
with several subtypes also in the mandatory part of the clas-
siﬁcation. The prevalence of ‘Resources and organization’
was so high that the type becomes useless, since a prevalence
of near 100% means that there is little useful discrimination.
Problems with resources and organizational factors may
always play a role in safety incidents (relative to other incident
types that are more speciﬁc). To address this, the general
type has subsequently been redeﬁned to include several sub-
types that are more speciﬁc and hence discriminating.
Not surprisingly, incident types with low prevalence and
high ICC, (e.g. ‘Suicide’ and ‘Falls’) are well deﬁned and spe-
ciﬁc incident types, but rare relative to other incident types.
‘Medication’, ‘Medical equipment’ and ‘Buildings and infra-
structure’ are similarly speciﬁc and well deﬁned but have a
very high prevalence relative to their high ICC. This cluster
suggests that the inter-rater reliability of some incident types
in the lower left quarter of the plot in Fig. 1 could be
improved by reﬁning deﬁnitions and improving the user
guide. Finally, in the lower left quarter of the plot in Fig. 1,
the cluster of ‘Other/unknown’ types (8, 15, 29) are ‘residual’
incident types that could be expected to have a low ICC and
fortunately in this instance also have a low prevalence.
The adequacy of the classification scheme
The fourth group of factors determining the inter-rater
agreement is related to the adequacy of the underlying classi-
ﬁcation scheme. The low prevalences of the ‘residual’ in-
cident types (e.g. Other/not known) indicate that the
underlying classiﬁcation scheme is reasonably adequate and
exhaustive. Others have noted that the ICPS-WHO is a con-
ceptual framework rather than a real classiﬁcation system
[10, 23]—a point which is also acknowledged by the authors
behind the WHO World Alliance for Patient Safety [1].
Moreover, Schulz et al. [23] argue that the framework ought
to be regarded, not as a taxonomy or a classiﬁcation system,
but as an ‘information model’ or ‘template’ since it violates a
number of characteristics of a proper classiﬁcation system,
e.g. the ICPS lacks identiﬁers or codes, central terms are
used with apparently different meanings and there is no
linkage between its ‘Key Concepts’ and the classiﬁcation
itself [23]. Nevertheless, the class of incident types, (being
one of the 10 classes of the ICPS) offers a detailed classiﬁca-
tion system that seems to capture the variety of medical task
contexts in which adverse events occur; and the results of
our pilot test seem to indicate that when slightly modiﬁed
it is a useable and reasonably reliable tool when put into
practice.
Conclusion
Judged from the kappa and ICC statistic, the overall inter-
rater agreement in this study was ‘fair’ to ‘good’ (using the
labels proposed by Fleiss [10]), which is a surprisingly high
level considering that participants had no training and per-
formed the classiﬁcation after a short, uncontrolled reading
of a short guideline. The pilot test gives some directions
about how inter-rater agreement could be improved.
Reporters of incidents should be encouraged to be precise
but avoid being too terse when describing a case. The broad
incident types with high prevalence and low ICC should be
subdivided into more speciﬁc subtypes, or their use should
be restricted by strict deﬁnitions and further instruction in
the user guide. Raters should be instructed to use only types
warranted by the information in the case description and to
refrain from speculating, and in general, raters should be
trained in applying the type deﬁnitions.
The class of incident types of the ICPS appears adequate,
exhaustive and well suited for classifying and structuring inci-
dents reports. At the same time, since incident types repre-
sent adverse events at levels that are clinically meaningful,
safety managers and other healthcare professionals should
ﬁnd them to be useful in classifying and retrieving incidents.
Figure 1 ICC and the prevalence of the 29 incident types in
58 cases. The dotted line represents the best ﬁt regression line
(ICC = 0.0304/prevalence + 0.2607), showing a strong inverse
association between ICC and prevalence. The numbers are the
numbers of the incident types in the mandatory part of
the classiﬁcation, see Table 4 for type titles. The prevalence of
an incident type was deﬁned, somewhat arbitrarily, as used by
‘at least one’ rater to classify the 58 cases.
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